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Abstract: 
This article offers a critique of Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu’s How the West Came 
to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism.  We argue that while all historiography features 
a number of silences, shortcomings or omissions, the omissions in How the West Came to Rule 
lead to a mistaken view of the emergence of capitalism.  There are two main issues to be 
confronted.  First, we argue that Anievas and Nişancioğlu have an inadequate and misleading 
understanding of ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’ that tilts them towards a theoretical stance that comes 
very close to arguing that everything caused capitalism while at the same time having no clear 
and convincing definition of ‘capital’ or ‘capitalism’.  Second, there are at least three omissions -
particular to England/Britain within a geopolitical context – that should be discussed in any 
attempt to explain the development of capitalism: the financial revolution and the Bank of 
England, the transition to coal energy and the capitalization of state power as it relates to war, 
colonialism and slavery.  We conclude by calling for a connected histories approach within the 
framework of capital as power.  
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There is little doubt that ‘any historical narrative is a particular bundle of silences.’ (Trouillot 
1995: 27).  These silences are unavoidable in any historiography, not least ones that attempt to 
account for the emergence of capitalism and the rise of the so-called ‘West’.  Such accounts have 
been perennial in IR/IPE and much is at stake in the present for how we understand and assess 
these accounts (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013, 2015; Beaud 2001; Bhambra 2010; Braudel 
1983; Brenner 1976, 1977, 1978; Byers 1996; Dimmock 2014; Dobb 1946/1963; Harman 2004, 
2006, 2008; Heller 1985, 2011; Hilton 1976a, 1976b, 1976c; Hobson 2004; McNally 1988; 
Mielants 2007; Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Sweezy 1954; Tawney 1926; Wallerstein 1974; Wood 
2002; Zmolek 2013).  This is particularly true for Marxists who generally think of capitalism as 
having hard-wired internal contradictions that will ultimately lead to its self-destruction and the 
dawn of communism. The aim of this article is to offer a foundational critique of one of the most 
recent and in many ways masterful Marxist accounts of the transition to capitalism and the ‘rise 
of the West’: How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism by Alexander 
Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu (2015).   Our main argument is that while ‘silences’ are 
inevitable in all historical accounts – including our own – the silences in How the West Came to 
Rule contribute to a mistaken view of the emergence of capitalism and the so-called rise of  
‘Western’ power.  As we see it, there are at least two main problems.  First, we argue that 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu have an inadequate and misleading understanding of ‘capital’ and 
‘capitalism’ that tilts them towards a theoretical stance that comes very close to arguing that 
everything caused capitalism while at the same time having no clear and convincing definition of 
‘capital’ or ‘capitalism’.  In their analysis there is also the liberal tendency to see capitalism as 
inevitable: history had to arrive at capitalism and the logic of accumulation – the only difference 
being some got there first.  Second, we argue that whatever the merits of their account – and at 
least in our judgment, they are considerable in many respects – there are crucial historical events 
that contribute to the emergence of capitalism that are completely overlooked, significantly 
weakening their overall argument.  To unpack our arguments, we have organized this article in 
the following way.  First, we provide a brief summary of the main argument in How the West 
Came to Rule.  With this in background, in part two we move to critically evaluate Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu’s understanding of ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’ from the Capital as Power perspective 
in critical IPE.  As readers will be able to tell, we find their analytical definition conceptually 
fuzzy and ultimately unconvincing.  This sets the stage for the third part of our article where we 
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discuss three major omissions that are, we argue, critical for a convincing explanation for the 
inter-societal or geopolitical emergence of global capitalism.  Briefly, these silences include the 
financial revolution and the creation of the Bank of England, the transition to coal energy, and 
last, the capitalization of the state as it relates to international warfare, colonialism and Atlantic 
slavery.  In the final section, we propose how debates might be able to move forward if we 
combine a connected histories approach with the Capital as Power perspective.  In this way, we 
will not only have a convincing definition of capital and capitalism but also an understanding of 
the international interconnections that geopolitically constituted and continue to constitute 
capitalism.     
How the West Came To Rule Key Arguments 
At base, Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu’s contribution to the debates on the 
emergence of capitalism and the rise of ‘Western power’ can be described as an attempt to 
internationalize the origins of capitalism and rise of Western Europe while providing 
considerable reasons for the decline – or at least growth plateau - of ‘Eastern civilizations’ (e.g. 
Chinese, Mongolian, and Ottoman).  Their analysis reflects existing debates on the need to 
challenge Eurocentric historiography that not only views the development of capitalism as 
internal to Europe but that also understands the development of captialism as a linear progression 
(Banaji 2007; Bhambra 2009; 2010; 2011; Chakrabarty 2000; Chalcraft 2005; Goody 2006; 
Shilliam 2004; Tansel 2015). They argue that:  
 
…the origins and history of capitalism can only be properly understood in 
international or geopolitical terms, and that this very ‘internationality’ is 
constitutive of capitalism as a historical mode of production. The existing 
conceptions of capitalism have hitherto failed to take this internationality 
seriously (2015: 2).  
 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu suggest that mainstream scholarly accounts see the ‘other’ or non-
European societies and populations as backward, unimportant and passive agents in the 
constitution of world capitalism (to our knowledge the foundational critique belongs to Wolf 
1982).  These traditional accounts display an implicit and sometimes more overt form of white 
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supremacy in their analyses where the ‘East’ is/was dependent on Europe’s so-called benevolent 
civilizing mission (Bowden 2004; 2009; Losurdo 2011).  Anievas and Nişancioğlu want to 
intervene with a counter-history that argues for the importance of colonialism, slavery, patriarchy 
and imperialism in the geopolitical constitution of European capitalism.  Through Leon 
Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development, they try to demonstrate that capitalism 
as a mode of production was co-constituted by many international determinants – particularly 
those emanating from the ‘East’.  At its most basic, the concept of uneven and combined 
development is the idea that many human communities were formed around the world with 
varying cultures, cosmologies and practices of social reproduction (uneven variation).  Over 
time, these communities come to interact with one another in various ways (culturally, 
economically, politically, and violently) and this leads to social change (different combinations).  
This concept leads Anievas and Nişancioğlu to a number of observations of which we mention 
only the two major below.   
 
First, Anievas and Nişancioğlu provide various examples that demonstrate how ‘Pax-Mongolica’ 
helped European societies’ capitalize on their ‘backwardness.’ An example of this is evident 
when the Mongols destabilized China whereby the Ming Empire had withdrawn their powerful 
merchant and naval fleet from the Indian Ocean (allowing Portuguese and Dutch ‘easy access’ to 
Eastern commercial markets). They were also able to securitize and stabilize trade routes (for 
merchants) ‘between the East and West.’ This, in turn, ‘facilitated the diffusion of such key 
military technologies as navigational techniques and gunpowder from East Asia to Europe – all 
of which were crucial to Europe’s subsequent rise to global prominence’ (2015: 69). Finally, due 
to increased trade, the Mongols also unintentionally brought the Black Plague into the heartland 
of Europe – an event, for which most historians take as a focal ‘take-off’ point for the 
transformation of English social property relations that led to capitalism (2015: 78ff).   
 
Second, the authors see a key role for the Ottoman Empire in co-constituting the birth of 
capitalism.  Here they argue that the Ottoman Empire was capable of defending itself from the 
imperial threat of the Habsburgs, partially closing off access to easy trade routes to the Eastern 
trade.  These obstacles to lucrative markets in the East forced European merchants to look for 
alternative routes.   Over time, this meant ‘a structural shift to Atlantic trade and Northwestern 
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European dominance, leading to processes of developmental “catch up” and overtake in Europe 
that would give rise to capitalism’ (2015: 94).  Put simply, the strength of the Ottoman Empire 
contributed to, if not caused, the development of a European led transatlantic economy that 
spurred greater capitalist development.   
	
However, the authors do not stop at critiquing Eurocentric cum Liberal triumphalist 
historiography, their main target appears to be two main strains of Eurocentric Neo-Marxism: 
World Systems Theory and Political Marxism.  The dispute between these two camps is largely 
‘whether the intensification of exchange relations (trade) or class conflict was the prime mover in 
the transition to capitalism’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015: 7 our emphasis).1  Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu argue that while World Systems Theory views the development of capitalism 
through an international lens, it (in particular Wallerstein) misses the historical specificity of 
capitalism’s emergence while at the same time underplaying the agency of Europe’s periphery 
(Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015: 14).   For its part, Political Marxism, according to Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu, often over-emphasizes the transformation of social property relations in the 
transition from English feudalism to the capitalist mode of production. Thus, they charge that 
Political Marxism ‘freezes capitalism’s history’ in England, also leading to a form of 
Eurocentrism insofar as the analysis of capitalism’s development is singularly focused on class 
struggle in England (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015: 24).  It should also be mentioned that they 
critique Post-Colonial Theory for under-acknowledging the cross-fertilization and influences 
between various ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ societies.    
 
To right these mistaken approaches, Anievas and Nişancioğlu attempt firstly to eliminate the 
conceptual binary of ‘East and West’ and secondly, to determine how pre-capitalist social 
relations in various Eastern Empires shaped and reshaped the geopolitical origins of capitalist 
modernity (i.e. Mongol and Ottoman).    Unlike the two neo-Marxist perspectives summarized 
above, the authors adopt a Neo-Marxist perspective that sees geopolitical interaction as a 
fundamental factor of the transition to the capitalist mode of production. Firstly, parts of Europe, 
especially England and the Netherlands, were able to ‘capitalize’ on their ‘privileges of 
																																								 																				
1 The choice of words here is interesting given our discussion of the importance of coal energy later in the article.  
The term ‘prime mover’ is an engineering or scientific term for any machine that converts energy into mechanical 
energy, typically for motive power.   
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backwardness’ to transform and ‘develop’ their societies ‘faster’ in order to be competitive with 
the ‘East’ which Anievas and Nişancioğlu claim had more ‘advanced’ societies. Secondly, 
because the ‘East’ was more ‘advanced’ than Europe, the authors’ reason that ‘Eastern’ societies 
were constrained by their very progressiveness.  Anievas and Nişancioğlu attribute this inability 
to ‘progress’ further to the complexities of hierarchy and the social reproduction of these 
hierarchies.  In this way the authors argue strongly that the concept of uneven and combined 
development helps scholars de-centralize Eurocentric renderings of capitalism and the ‘rise of 
the West.’2  We will leave it to other scholars to debate the precise merits of the concept of 
uneven and combined development but of the geopolitical origins and connected histories of 
capitalism there can be little doubt.  Anievas and Nişancioğlu’s work should be applauded for its 
focus on interconnections and reviving the importance of colonialism, patriarchy, slavery and 
imperialism in the constitution of capitalism and European power.  However, tracing the origins 
of something – geopolitical or otherwise – requires an analytical definition of what we are 
seeking to find.  It would be absurd to go searching for a ‘dog’ if we had no clue what the term 
‘dog’ refers to. This is where we argue that Anievas and Nişancioğlu have an inadequate and 
misleading understanding of ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’ that tilts them towards a theoretical stance 
that comes very close to arguing that everything caused capitalism, is capitalism or contributed 
to the emergence of capitalism all the while having no convincing definition of ‘capital’ or 
‘capitalism’.  We turn to this argument in the next section. 
 
Of Capital and Capitalism 
 
In their work, Anievas and Nişancioğlu provide no precise analytical definition of what capital 
is, how it is accumulated and for what purposes. They do, however, state that ‘capital’ is not a 
‘thing’ like a machine, a pool of money or profit and eventually settle on the idea that capital is a 
social relation between owners of the means of production and wage-workers (2015: 8).  Yet, 
since wage-labor remains central to their ontology of capitalism and they claim to follow Marx, 
																																								 																				
2 In their words: ‘...how the asynchronic simultaneity of a plurality of existing societies (unevenness) came to 
interact in ways that generated further substantive sociological differences (geopolitical combinations), in turn 
leading to sharp divergences in their developmental trajectories. This is in fact a hallmark of any inter-societal 
system: they are generatively differentiating through the very interactive plurality of their units’ (Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu 2015: 250).	
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we are lead to the contradictory claim that ‘capital’ is in fact a material entity or a ‘thing’.  
Sorting out this confusion requires some explaining.3  
 
In the annals of political economy there are only two theoretical traditions that provide us with 
clear, albeit mistaken, analytical definitions of capital.  The first is the neoclassical school of 
Economics that understands capital largely as a material entity (though ideas/technology are 
sometimes included) used in production.  For example, one of the most widely used textbooks 
argues that capital ‘is the set of tools that workers use: the construction worker’s crane, the 
accountant’s calculator, and this author’s personal computer’ (Mankiw 2010: 47).  So in this 
formulation, it follows that if we are accumulating capital we are attempting to get ahold of more 
and more factors of production over time.  Obviously, this is not what capitalists pursue as an 
end goal and so, despite other problems, we can dismiss this definition as rather absurd or 
incorrect.   The second definition of ‘capital’ stems directly from Marx and was absorbed by the 
Marxist tradition uncritically.  Though we share many affinities with this tradition – particularly 
the will to historicize the present - we have to first understand that Marx had a split personality.  
The first is Marx as historian, concerned to demonstrate that the origins of capitalism lie in the 
dispossession or expropriation of peasants from their means of subsistence, thereby creating the 
potential for the exploitation of wage-labor.  The second is Marx the- would-be scientist (he tried 
to dedicate the first volume of Capital to Darwin but Darwin refused the gesture) who believed 
that capitalism had laws of motion that could be uncovered and understood.  Identifying these 
‘natural’ laws of motion is supposed to contribute to our ability to predict future outcomes – in 
Marx’s case, the emergence of communism out of the contradictions of capitalism.  It is Marx 
the scientist, not Marx the historian, who provided us with a definition of capital as surplus dead 
labor (Di Muzio 2014: 3).  The two most relevant passages are: 
Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and 
lives the more, the more labour it sucks. The time during which the labourer 
works, is the time during which the capitalist consumes the labour-power he has 
purchased of him (1867: 160). 
																																								 																				
3 The confusion begins with Marx who thinks of capital as a ‘social relation’.  But when he comes to define it 
analytically to explain exploitation in the workplace, ‘capital’ becomes ‘dead labor’ or machines/objects that 
produce commodities.   
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And 
But it is only in the factory system that this inversion for the first time acquires 
technical and palpable reality. By means of its conversion into an automaton, the 
instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during the labour-process, in the 
shape of capital, of dead labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour-
power. The separation of the intellectual powers of production from the manual 
labour, and the conversion of those powers into the might of capital over labour, 
is, as we have already shown finally completed by modern industry erected on the 
foundation of machinery (1867: 282 our emphasis). 
In other words, though a bit more philosophically sophisticated than the neoclassical economists, 
‘capital’ is understood as material things used in the production process of commodities.  The 
reason why Marx offers a slightly more sophisticated account is because he argues that the only 
thing that can produce more value in the process of producing commodities is human-labor 
power – essentially the capacity to work.  From a philosophical vantage point, Marx argued that 
when this labor-power is expended in production it is objectified or turned into material things or 
more accurately factors of production that help produce commodities.  In sum, capital is dead 
labor/machines and therefore from a Marxist point of view, when we say we are accumulating 
capital we must mean we are accumulating more material things able to help us produce 
commodities.  This is taking Marx seriously and at his ‘scientific’ word. But of course, in actual 
reality, no capitalist pursues the accumulation of evermore machines or evermore laborers.  We 
would hope that Anievas and Nişancioğlu agree with us that there can be no doubt that what 
capitalists really want is more differential power measured in money, not more machines or 
factors of production as an end goal.  Marx undoubtedly knew that the goal was to get evermore 
money, but his definition of capital committed him to viewing it as a material entity rather than 
an abstract register (money units) of social power.  But why do both schools have a 
demonstrably inaccurate understanding of ‘capital’?  Part of what helps to explain the 
neoclassical and Marxist confusion is the misunderstanding of the term ‘capital’ in Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, which both traditions adopted in their own way.   
Now, there is little doubt that the etymology of the term ‘capital’ has deep historical roots which 
are of some interest (on the etymology which we do not trace here see Braudel 1983: 232ff).  
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However, what seems clear is that in business vernacular before the Wealth of Nations (1776), 
capital meant a sum of money to invest or alternatively, a sum of money already invested in 
expected profitable activities.   We should take note that it is investment in ‘profitable activities’ 
that matter, not factory production per se.  As Cannan argues, it was Adam Smith who created 
considerable confusion when he redefined capital as material goods used in production.  This 
was a ‘very serious departure from the conception of capital which had hitherto prevailed. 
Instead of making the capital a sum of money which is to be invested, or which has been 
invested in certain things, Smith makes it the things themselves’ (1921: 480 our emphasis).  This 
conceptual error has certainly been passed down to neoclassical Economics and with some 
considerable philosophical finesse, to Marxism as well.  Both neoclassical Economics and 
Marxism understand capital as a material entity used in production, albeit quantified in a 
monetary unit.  In this way, the accumulation of ‘capital’ in neoclassical Economics is the 
accumulation of factors of production and for Marxists, the accumulation of dead labor or 
instruments used in the production of commodities.4  This is likely why there is considerable 
conflation of the terms ‘industrial revolution’ and ‘capitalism’ – particularly in the Marxist 
literature.  Clearly, there’s a big problem with both understandings since capitalists want to have 
their capitalization (measured in a monetary unit of account) rise faster relative to others and 
industrialization, as the Soviet Union demonstrated, does not have to follow any capitalist logic.     
 
As we have suggested, if we are looking to contribute to debates on the geopolitical origins of 
capitalism than it would be a good idea to have both a sound and convincing analytical definition 
of ‘capital’, not to mention a clear definition of ‘capitalism’.  As it turns out, the definition of 
‘capitalism’ provided by Anievas and Nişancioğlu is even more muddled than their 
understanding of ‘capital’: 
 
…capitalism is best understood as a set of configurations, assemblages, or bundles of 
social relations and processes oriented around the systematic reproduction of the capital 
relation, but not reducible – either historically or logically – to that relation alone. By 
placing an emphasis on such configurations and assemblages, we also seek to highlight 
how the reproduction and competitive accumulation of capital through the exploitation of 
																																								 																				
4 Technically, for neoclassical Economics it is the accumulation of ‘utils’ or units of satisfaction.   
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wage-labour presupposes a wide assortment of differentiated social relations that make this 
reproduction and accumulation possible (2015: 9 our emphasis on the word capital).5 
  
This passage is brimming with considerable confusion.  First, we are told that capitalism is best 
understood as ‘relations and processes’ that help reproduce the capital relation – which Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu tell us is the relationship between wage-laborers and capitalist owners of the 
means of production.  We are then warned not to see this relation as the only important social 
relation.  We are asked to consider how ‘a wide assortment of differentiated social relations’ 
helped to reproduce the dominant relation and makes the accumulation of capital possible.  This 
is akin to throwing everything at the wall to see what sticks, except that everything sticks: 
virtually everything caused and/or supported capitalism or is itself capitalism – the reader is left 
to his or her own devices to sort out the confusion.  Secondly, we are once again accumulating 
‘capital’ or dead labor/machines and while we are told that other ‘relations and processes’ are 
important, the accumulation of capital is achieved through ‘the exploitation of wage-labour’.  
Thus, this passage also suggests that there is no accumulation of ‘capital’ outside the exploitation 
of wage-labor, which obviously flies in the face of history and seems to contradict their argument 
that colonial enterprise and the slave trade were important for the rise of capitalism.  
In the end, we are left with highly unconvincing analytical definitions and are forced, if we are to 
interpret and understand the geopolitical origins of capitalism, to find a convincing alternative. 
We argue that the convincing alternative can be found in the Capital as Power approach to 
international political economy introduced by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009).  
Capital as Power 
The Capital as Power approach has a clear definition of capital as ‘commodified differential 
power’ measured in money and avoids any ‘mode of production’ theorizing.  Rather than focus 
on industrial production and the particular organization of workers within a firm, the focus is on 
capitalism as a mode of power and this means a keen focus on the act of capitalization rooted in 
ownership.  Capitalization is the chief ritual of capitalism and it has two meanings.  First, it is the 
																																								 																				
5 The remainder of the quote goes on to say: ‘These relations may take numerous forms, such as coercive state 
apparatuses, ideologies and cultures of consent, or forms of power and exploitation that are not immediately given in 
or derivative of the simple capital–wage-labour relation, such as racism and patriarchy’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 
2015: 9). 
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act of discounting to present value an expected future flow of income adjusted by some factor of 
risk.  The primary reason why this act is done by owners/investors is because of the time value 
theory of money.  This simple theory argues that a unit of currency (e.g. dollar, Euro, Yen), is 
worth more today than it is tomorrow because it can start generating interest sooner.  This is why 
capitalists discount future flows of income and it should be noted that anything that generates an 
income stream can, at least theoretically, be capitalized.  The second definition of capitalization 
when applied to corporations is the market value of the firm.  This is easily calculated by taking 
the number of shares outstanding and multiplying it by the price of one share at any given point 
in time.  Shares in companies represent a claim to future earnings with the overall value of 
capitalization fluctuating based on expected earnings and actual earnings when they are reported.  
Poor earnings or returns typically send share prices down while meeting and beating earnings 
expectations sends the perceived money value of the company up.  Yet, unlike the neoclassicals 
and their Marxist counterparts, the Capital as Power perspective argues that earnings are not a 
narrow offshoot of producing commodities, but the result of a broader power process that shapes 
and reshapes the terrain of social reproduction.  For example, Apple’s capitalization is not simply 
contingent on producing iPhones, tablets, computers etc. but on a range of social power 
processes from advertising to trade and labor laws to intellectual property protection by 
governments – all these factors and more bear on its earnings.  We should also point out that 
capitalization is not ‘fictitious capital’ – a point which has confused Marxists for over a century - 
but purchased ownership claims to future flows of income.  Thus, when we capitalize Apple (buy 
equity in the company), we are in essence capitalizing Apple’s power to shape and reshape the 
terrain of social reproduction in ways that generate better earnings than its rivals in the corporate 
universe.  This is also true for every capitalist firm listed on an exchange.  The difference, 
however, is the organized differential power of corporations and those who own them.  What this 
suggests is that corporations with the highest levels of capitalization (market value) have greater 
power to shape and reshape the terrain of social reproduction in their favor to generate 
differential earnings.   And since these ownership claims are tradable or vendible, this is why 
capital is defined as commodified differential power measured in a money of account.  Thus, 
when we talk about ‘accumulation’ in the Capital as Power framework, we mean rising 
capitalization of owned income generating assets (the monetary value of claims to future 
income) regardless of the composition of the assets.  With this in the background, we are now in 
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a position to define the term ‘capitalism’.  Capitalism is a politico-economic system premised on 
the social property relations between hierarchically arranged owners and non-owners whereby 
income-generating assets are differentially capitalized based on the institutional power of 
business and governments to generate income streams by shaping and reshaping the landscape of 
social reproduction through the market and price system.6  To be a capitalist then, is to be an 
owner/investor in income generating assets with the difference between capitalists largely 
stemming from the monetary value of their capitalization or claims on future earnings.  By social 
reproduction we mean the way any society produces, consumes and reproduces its lifestyles, 
how it conceives of these lifestyles and how they defend them juridically or through the 
application of violence.  In this way, the Capital as Power approach to international political 
economy has no difficulty whatsoever in seeing how different forms of labor, as well as different 
forms of discrimination and exploitation can coexist historically – a benefit claimed by Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu for uneven and combined development perspectives. For example, slaves are 
non-owners of any income generating assets, including their own labor.  But transatlantic slavery 
was a wholly capitalized enterprise from the for-profit companies who transported and sold 
slaves in the Americas and Caribbean to the work done on plantations.  To take but one example 
of many, consider that most of the Southern planters who would eventually lead the American 
Revolution were deeply in debt to Northern and British financiers (Thomas 1993: 52).  In effect, 
these financiers were capitalizing the work of slaves for profit on plantations as slave masters 
repaid their mortgages (among other debts) at interest to their creditors (Baptist 2014).   More 
than this, the slave system in the United States and elsewhere also helped erect an international 
economy enabling the further capitalization of additional income streams (e.g. tobacco, sugar, 
cotton, iron).  Marxists have to get out of the factory floor and come to see the world how 
capitalists actually see it: from the point of view of capitalization.     
The Geopolitical Emergence of Capitalism    
With clear definitions of ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’ we are now in a position to explore some of 
the conceptual silences and significant historical omissions in How the West Came to Rule.  To 
do so, we will not be looking for a precise birthday for capitalism since the history of 
																																								 																				
6 There is no separation between an ‘economic’ sphere and a ‘political’ sphere in the Capital as Power approach, 
they are theorized as fused as they are in daily practice. 
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capitalization, while somewhat traceable, is considerably obscure (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 
147ff).  We argue that what is important to uncover are the conditions ‘that contributed to the 
intensification (increasing orders of magnitude) and extensification (socio-spatial scope) of 
capitalism’ to the point where total outstanding world capitalization is US$294 trillion – most of 
which consists of debt instruments (Di Muzio 2015: 48).7  Surely all the factors that allowed for 
this massive increase in capitalized income-generating assets is overdetermined, but are there 
identifiable major factors, without which, we will fail to explain the development of capitalism in 
a convincing way?  We argue that there are such major factors and we consider three below that 
are omitted from How the West Came to Rule: the financial revolution and the creation of the 
Bank of England, the transition to coal energy and the capitalization of the state as it relates to 
international warfare, colonialism and Atlantic slavery. 
The Importance of Credit/Money Creation 
If capitalists are mostly concerned to accumulate more money units faster relative to those trying 
to do the same, it would be a reasonable idea to understand where money comes from and how it 
is produced.  What is too often underappreciated is that in the 17th century in England there were 
extensive debates on the dearth of money.  As Wennerlind puts it ‘while modern economic 
theory does not recognize the possibility of a scarcity of money, seventeenth-century thinkers 
were consumed by this problem’ (2011: 17 our emphasis; see also Di Muzio and Robbins 2016).  
Indeed, even by the time of Adam Smith it was common to note that ‘no complaint, however, is 
more common than that of a scarcity of money’ (1776: 348).   While there were other forms of 
money in circulation by the 17th century such as tokens and tallies, the most dominant form of 
money was thought to be silver and gold (Davies 2002; Ingham 2004).  Gold and silver forms of 
coined money were particularly coveted by rulers and merchant capitalists to finance military 
operations abroad and purchase goods predominantly produced in Asia.  Since Asians did not 
particularly desire European goods in considerable quantities – and even less so the goods 
produced in England – many Asian rulers would only trade for silver, gold or their 
representatives (e.g. paper bills).  The difficulty was that there was a dearth of silver and gold in 
England in the seventeenth century if not before.  One of the reasons for the constant search for 
																																								 																				
7 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/global-stock-market-cap-has-doubled-since-qes-start-2015-02-12 The figure is 
for 2014 and as yet has not been updated by McKinsey. (4/14/2016). 
	
13	
	
coin was that, while English merchants and slave-runners were bringing coin into the realm from 
the increasing Atlantic trade, considerable amounts of coinage subsequently left England for 
Norway, Sweden and the Baltic to pay for imports of timber and iron ore (Thomas 1993: 60 and 
74).  Thomas captures the interconnections: 
Britain’s huge favourable trade balance with Portugal was settled in bullion from 
Brazil whose gold shipments to Portugal increased from £350,000 in 1700 to 
£2,200,000 in 1760. (Fisher 1969:153) Large gold imports into England, based on 
the rapid growth of Brazil’s slave economy, 1695–1750, helped to make London 
the financial centre of Europe and contributed to the financing of the crucial 
imports of iron, timber and naval stores from the Baltic (199: 37). 
 
Without access to this timber and iron for fuel and the construction of ships, the Cromwellian 
naval revolution that ignited the capitalist British Empire would not have taken place.  The 
money problem had to be solved.  At first, intellectuals associated with the Hartlib Circle – an 
early scientific correspondence society that spanned some of Europe – thought they could create 
silver and gold by alchemy.  The Hartlib Circle was not so concerned with the eastern trade but 
with the discourse of improvement and the possibility of ever greater productive change 
(Wennerlind 2011: 44ff).  The problem, as they understood it, was liquidity: how could the 
money supply be increased to circulate more goods and services if ‘real’ or ‘dominant’ money 
was thought to be only gold and silver coins?  Failing alchemy, there were only a few ways the 
metallic money supply could increase: 1) find new mines at home or abroad, 2) plunder the 
metals from others, 3) debase the currency (less metal per coin), and last, 4) ensure a trade 
surplus with foreign countries (more coins enter than exit the country).  However, as Wennerlind 
argues, what eventually occurred was an epistemological revolution.  It was finally discovered 
that money need not be metallic coins per se.  This realization freed thinking on the liquidity 
issue and lead to considerable debate on how to set up an institution that could issue credit that 
could act as money.  There were multiple proposals of how this could be done, but in the forcing 
house of European geopolitics and near constant warfare, a decision was made to accept the 
proposal of London financiers to institute a Bank of England (Davies 2002: 255ff and Horsefield 
1960).  In 1694, six years after the so-called Glorious Revolution that installed William of 
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Orange and Mary II to the throne of England, William Paterson’s proposal was institutionalized.  
Many believe it was the Dutch influence on English finance that inspired the creation of the 
Bank of England.  But whatever the English may have learned from Dutch finance and fiscal 
policy, all evidence points to the fact that the Bank of England operated in quite a different way 
than the Bank of Amsterdam (Vilar 1984: 204ff and 211ff). The latter never actually extended 
the money supply, generally keeping a one to one ratio of notes and coin (Wennerlind 2011: 
128).  The Bank of England, however, did extend the money supply over and above the silver 
coin it had on hand, thereby increasing the money supply.  The act of creating new currency as 
credit to the King-in-Parliament did not totally overcome the dearth of money problem, but there 
is little doubt that it expanded the money supply and helped to finance the War of the League of 
Augsburg based on a permanent loan – a fact that we will return to below when we discuss the 
capitalization of the state (Davies 2002: 259).  Thus, the establishment of the Bank of England, 
and later additional provincial banks issuing their own money as credit helped to expand the 
money supply that supports industry, trade and the accumulation of more money/capitalization 
and power.  As Wennerlind observed: 
Noting that England already possessed all the natural, economic, and human 
resources  required for great prosperity and geopolitical strength, Mackworth 
argued that with the establishment of the Bank, the nation was now capable of 
capitalizing on this potential. “Our Country,” he argued, “thus accomplish’d with 
all Blessings, as to Fertility and Ingenuity, a little help [from the Bank] will make 
it the most Glorious Place in the World, and His Majesty the most Potent Prince 
in Christendom.” He argued that the bank was first to settle “the Great Question . 
. . [of] How to raise a Stock or Fund that shall be credited by all.” The fact that 
the Bank’s notes were assignable by law and secured by Parliament’s power to 
tax ensured that the notes would retain their value and thus be able to serve as a 
pledge in market exchanges (2011: 112-113).8 
 
Thus, omitting the source of new money creation is a significant oversight, particularly because 
‘the Bank’s notes circulated at par from the start, signaling the arrival of England’s and Europe’s 
																																								 																				
8 Sir Humphrey Mackworth (1657–1727) was an industrial entrepreneur. 
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first widely circulating credit currency (Wennerlind 2011: 109 our emphasis). But here we arrive 
at a crucial question: why was the dearth of money question so crucial to answer in England by 
the 17th century and why ultimately did this solution work to increase liquidity when Law’s 
somewhat similar scheme failed in France?   We might also ask why Spain and Portugal, who 
imported boatloads of gold and silver did not experience a more fully capitalist and productive 
manufacturing economy?  We find sufficient evidence to suggest that the answer lies in the 
dearth of wood and the capitalization of the state. 
 
The Importance of Coal Energy 
If as Wennerlind points out, the dearth of money problem consumed intellectuals in England at 
least by the 17th century, it was equaled by a concern over the shortage of wood.  Like Marx, 
Marxists have traditionally treated energy as an auxiliary in production and as a result have 
largely ignored the fact that England was the first country to go through a massive energy 
transition to non-renewable coal energy (Debeir et al 1991: xiii).9     The question is why the 
English turned to coal more intensely than any other political community on the planet?  The 
answer is that at least in the seventeenth century if not well before, there was an energy crisis in 
England. (Cipolla 1997; Fouquet and Pearson 1998; Goldstone 2002; Malanima 2006; Nef 1997; 
Podobnik 2006; Smil 1994: 159; Thomas 1986; Wrigley 2010). The English had denuded most 
of their forests for fuelwood, charcoal to make iron implements, boats, homes, cities and 
weapons among other things.  The available evidence is canvassed in Di Muzio (2015: 62ff) but 
perhaps the biggest indicator of historical change is the fact that the cost of timber was 
skyrocketing well above the price for timber in neighboring France and well above general prices 
in England (Williams 2006: 153).  In this situation, as well as if elites wanted to compete for a 
share of the world’s wealth geopolitically and not have her security threatened, England was 
basically forced to rely on domestic coal as a primary energy source. This reliance massively 
increased the energy available to England (and Great Britain after 1707) and had a number of 
knock-on effects that would eventually lead to an expanding money supply and the greater 
capacity to produce goods and services, particularly but not exclusively, pig iron.  The only other 
																																								 																				
9	Marx clearly states: ‘Raw material may either form the principal substance of a product, or it may enter into its 
formation only as an accessory. An accessory may be consumed by the instruments of labour, as coal under a boiler, 
oil by a wheel, hay by draft-horses, or it may be mixed with the raw material in order to produce some modification 
thereof’ (1887: 127).	
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major producers in Europe – Belgium, France and Germany – which took to coal production 
comparatively late, produced far, far less than Britain even by 1850-4 when the steam engine 
was beginning to be used more frequently in industry (Wrigley 2010: 98-99).  In other words, 
Great Britain was the first nation to undergo a fossil fuel energy revolution and found a global 
empire on the surplus energy provided by coal.  In fact, the first practical steam engine – the sine 
qua non of the industrial revolution because it helped increase the capacity able to be capitalized 
- which ran on coal, was largely invented by an ironmonger to solve the problem of pumping 
water out of coal and tin mines more effectively (Allen 2011: 375).  The trouble of actually 
getting coal and tin out of the pits lead to the idea of railways, which over time, revolutionized 
global transportation and facilitated colonial capitalist exploitation as railway construction 
internationalized (Davis and Wilburn 1991: 3; Smil 1994: 160).  We should not underestimate 
this point as Hick reminds us: 
 [Early cotton machinery] fits better as an appendage to the evolution of the old 
industry than in the way it is usually presented as the beginning of the new…. 
There is continuity between the eighteenth-century development of Lancashire 
and the West Riding and the pre-Industrial Revolution world. There might have 
been no Crompton and Arkwright, and still there could have been an Industrial 
Revolution (cited in Cipolla 1977: 211).10 
 
It is for this reason why we argue that Britain can be conceived of as the first fossil fueled market 
civilization with a rising money supply backed by the surplus energy capacity provided by its 
reliance on coal (Di Muzio 2015; Gill 1995).  Expanding the money supply – as in France, Spain 
and Portugal – without adding manufacturing capacity largely resulted in rising prices for a 
limited amount of goods produced by an organic, not fossil fueled, economy.  
It is here where we should give pause and consider the argument most forcefully put forward by 
the Political Marxists that a revolution in agrarian social property relations was required for the 
birth of capitalism.  The main idea here is that waves of enclosure and the loss of customary 
access to the land in the English country-side expropriated a significant portion of the peasantry 
																																								 																				
10 Sir Richard Arkwright is credited with having patented the spinning/water frame while Samuel Crompton is 
credited with developing the spinning mule.   
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(class war) and forced them to work for wages in order to meet their subsistence needs.  The 
threat of hunger, as most elites realized at the time, was a spur to work for the non-owning class 
(Polanyi 1957: 90-92).  After the Norman Conquest (1066) more and more rents were commuted 
to money rather than in kind, and this contributed to a competitive market in leaseholds (Smith 
1776: 28).11  If capitalist tenant farmers and their waged workers did not produce according to 
the expected future yield of the land surveyor, they could lose their leasehold and therefore their 
livelihood (Wood 2002: 101ff).  The corollary is that this competitive atmosphere, combined 
with the desire of landlords to improve their returns on the land led to greater growth, innovation 
and improvements.  But while we can admit that farming practices did improve due to the 
competitive environment for leaseholds and the pressure introduced by the surveyor’s estimates, 
no amount of human labor on a farm or pasture alone could have contributed to the 
intensification (increasing orders of magnitude) and extensification (socio-spatial scope) of 
capitalization.  Without the mass exploitation of coal across the economy, Britain would have 
remained like the rest of the world – an organic economy whose social reproduction remained 
chained to the rhythms of photosynthesis and limited energy stores and flows.  Moreover, the 
dispossession that occurred in the countryside did not lead to capitalists exploiting a newly 
created class of wage reliant workers in their entirety.  As is well documented, the primary result 
of the great expropriations was not mass proletarianization but mass pauperization and the 
criminalization of the poor (Marx 1867: section 8; Polanyi 1957: 90-92).   So while the Political 
Marxists are correct that a revolution in social property relations did take place thanks to the 
enclosure movements – a qualitative break with the past not simply a quantitative increase of 
money/goods - they are vastly mistaken that this and this alone would have led to an increase in 
industrious capacity and greater capitalization over time.  The enclosure movement was indeed a 
class war, but it was one that primarily solidified ownership over sheep pastures and arable land 
while creating a majority class of non-owners with the capacity and incentive (hunger) to work 
for a wage (Thomas 1993: 67).  But there is still one more revolution that contributed to the 
development of capitalism: the capitalization of the state and how this capitalization related to 
war, colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade.  
																																								 																				
11 Smith write that: ‘The revenues of the ancient Saxon kings of England are said to have been paid, not in money, 
but in kind, that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts. William the Conqueror introduced the custom of paying 
them in money. This money, however, was for a long time, received at the exchequer, by weight, and not by tale.’	
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The Capitalization of State Power and War, Colonialism and Slavery 
We agree with Anievas and Nişancioğlu’s argument that war played a crucial role in the 
constitution and reconstitution of capitalism and the so-called rise of the ‘West’ but we believe 
they downplay its role when it should be elevated to primary importance given the scale of the 
enterprise and the fact that it was the chief contributor to the capitalizable national debt (Brewer 
1989).  We suggest that it is very difficult to understand how war contributed to the development 
of capitalism without understanding the capitalization of the state.  Marx recognized this fact, but 
he never developed it: 
The system of public credit, i.e., of national debts, whose origin we discover in 
Genoa and Venice as early as the Middle Ages, took possession of Europe 
generally during the manufacturing period. The colonial system with its maritime 
trade and commercial wars served as a forcing-house for it. Thus it first took root 
in Holland. National debts, i.e., the alienation of the state [by sale] – whether 
despotic, constitutional or republican – marked with its stamp the capitalistic era. 
The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the 
collective possessions of modern peoples is their national debt. (1867: 529). 
The role of the national debt is crucial for understanding the development of capitalism and war 
as interconnected, as it remains today.  For example, the United States has the world’s largest 
military, spends the most money on the preparation for war or fighting war and also has the 
world’s largest national debt.  While the dearth of money problem spurred debate on monetary 
reform it should always be remembered that the ultimate solution – the creation of the Bank of 
England - was institutionalized not just to create credit money for the sake of commerce but 
primarily to finance war against France: 
The Bank of England came into being by the Ways and Means Act of June 1694 
and was confirmed by a Royal Charter of Incorporation (27 July 1694). The Act 
makes it clear that its real purpose was to raise money for the War of the League 
of Augsburg by taxation and by the novel device of a permanent loan…(Davies 
2002: 259).  
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The Bank of England capitalized the state to the tune of £1,200,000 in return for an 8 per cent 
annual return plus a yearly management fee of £4,000 (Davies 2002: 260; Wennerlind 2011: 
108ff).  The Bank’s notes were redeemable in coin but the Bank’s inventor – William Paterson – 
understood that only a small percentage of silver coin (15 to 25%) was needed to ensure the 
confidence in the use and circulation of the notes (Wennerlind 2011: 110).  While we will likely 
never know the amount of money that actually backed up the notes issued by the Bank of 
England, even at the high end of 25% backing it would be £300,000 of silver.  To help finance 
this operation and lend confidence to the Bank’s investors, the Parliament introduced a new tax 
on alcohol and shipping.  This was to be the direct stream of income capitalized by the 1300 
domestic and international investors in the Bank of England but in effect, the investors were 
capitalizing far more.  From the point of view of Capital as Power, what the investors had 
actually capitalized was the power of Parliament to wage war, tax the population and to punish 
those who refused such taxation.  Trust in this new fiscal system – as the liberals are wont to 
stress - was also backed by a new constitutional order that made the monarchy subordinate to 
Parliament.  But we should also recall that this financial revolution was also backed by a re-
coinage of silver overseen by Isaac Newton and a penal system with vicious punishments for 
coin clippers and counterfeiters (Wennerlind 2011; McNally 2014).  The tradeable ‘national 
debt’ backed by Parliament’s power to tax, wage war and punish offenders was at the center of 
British capital markets as it established a normal rate of return or a benchmark with which to 
help value other investments in the emerging join-stock enterprises. At the same time, as 
Dickson’s (1967) work has shown, the financial revolution helped fund external imperialism and 
internal economic growth.  And as is well known, the British ‘national’ debt became the center 
of global finance as the ‘national’ debts of other countries were listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and British capital financed foreign exploits (Attard and Dilley 2013; Hobson 1902; 
Johnston 1935; Michie 2001).12  To be sure, over time, the desire of the British ruling class to 
fight continental and colonial wars along with support the transatlantic slave trade was a major 
factor in calling forth greater steel and coal/energy production, a mounting national debt and a 
vast array of newly capitalizable productivity.  All four were brought together under a strong 
naval policy during the time of Cromwell and as wars increased in frequency and expense after 
1688, the policy only strengthened.  Brewer gives us a glimpse of its importance: 
																																								 																				
12 See also the special issue of The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol 13, I 3 1985.  
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Naval dockyards were, by the standards of the day, immense enterprises. They 
were the largest industrial units in the country, dwarfing their nearest rivals, the 
breweries and the mines. During the War of Austrian Succession, for example, the 
Portsmouth dockyard employed a workforce of over 2000. By the 1770s the total 
labor force in naval dockyards had reached over 8000, with half of these men 
working at Portsmouth and Plymouth. The navy was thus one of the largest single 
employers of civilian labor in eighteenth-century England. Naval ships and 
shipbuilding operated on a scale quite unlike that of civilian industry and 
commerce. Capital and labor were deployed in a manner that was beyond the 
resources of the merchant or manufacturer. Only the state could undertake 
enterprises on such a scale (1989: 28 our emphasis). 
 
This passage not only demonstrates the scale of the enterprise but points to the fact that it is an 
historical absurdity to see any separation between ‘capital’ and the ‘state’, both are fused through 
the process of capitalization.13   As Nitzan and Bichler assert: 
In fact, state and capital were always symbiotic, coalescent, and often fused. The 
modern nation state, from its very beginning, was highly dependent on capitalist 
finance, while capitalization was similarly reliant on state power. Indeed, it was 
this fusion between them which gave rise to the first form of modern capital – the 
government bond…(202: 13) 
 
What is more, to emphasize the importance of war-fighting and the preparation for war in the 
origins of capitalism consider the fact that the total fixed capital invested in 243 mills working in 
the West Riding woolen industry was a mere £402,651 by 1800 whereas the figure is £2.25 
million in 1750 for the Royal Navy.  As Brewer observes, the ‘fixed capital in one of the largest 
sectors of the nation’s most important industry [wool] was therefore a mere 18 per cent of the 
fixed capital required to launch the British navy (1989: 27).  Thus, it cannot be stressed enough 
that in Britain the largest capitalized entity was the state and its capacity for war and taxation and 
continues to be the state and its capacity for war along with its overall ability to generate an 
																																								 																				
13	Anievas and Nişancioğlu do notice the importance of shipbuilding but it is fairly underplayed and its links with 
energy and the capitalization of the state and the eventual creation of a ‘national’ debt are ignored. 	
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income stream from its regulation of a growing economy.  For example, the British state is 
capitalized at US$3 trillion while its largest company, Royal Dutch Shell is capitalized at about 
US$133 billion.  The last thing to note in this section is that other than the Bank of England and 
the British government, there were only two other major capitalized entities until the eighteenth 
century: the British East India Company and the South Sea Company.   In the early eighteenth 
century, both had capitalized the British government by lending all of their total paid up capital 
to the state (Michie 2001: 18).  Thus, investors were not simply capitalizing the British East 
India Company’s ability to colonize and control trade in India and its neighboring regions or the 
South Sea Company’s monopoly on the slave trade to Spanish America, but through the national 
debt, also the war-fighting capacity of the state and its (eventually) unparalleled Royal Navy. 
Moreover, the British East India Company was responsible for imposing a ‘national’ debt on 
India during its reign which was linked not just to taxation and public works, but to war (Dutt 
1950: chapter X).  Di Muzio (2015) discusses the deep interconnections between capitalism and 
war in greater length elsewhere, but the evidence provided here should be enough to suggest that 
the capitalization of the British state and its role in facilitating colonialism, war and the slave 
trade had everything to do with the geopolitical origins of capitalism.             
Conclusion: Connected Histories and Capital as Power 
In many ways, Anievas and Nişancioğlu’s work has done a great service to critical international 
political economy in advancing the debates on the emergence of capitalism as a geopolitical 
phenomenon.  It is a considerable accomplishment and while we have stressed some of its 
omissions rather than its accomplishments, we share their concern for geopolitical origins while 
also keeping in mind what was peculiar to England and later Great Britain.  We have argued that 
there are two key flaws in their explanation.  The first is the unconvincing definition of ‘capital’ 
and their conceptually fuzzy definition of ‘capitalism’.  Received truths and old dogmas die hard 
but we believe in the power of reason, logic and evidence and hope that those working in the 
Marxist tradition – who share a critical approach to capitalism along with us – understand that 
fuzzy or conceptually incorrect definitions of capital and capitalism will seriously hamper our 
visions of a more humane, progressive and sustainable future and how we might pursue these 
visions in political action.  As Bhambra reminds us: ‘the ways in which we understand the past 
are crucial to our understandings of ourselves and the world in which we live today and…if our 
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understandings of the past are inadequate it follows that our grasp of the present will also be 
inadequate’ (Bhambra 2009: 2).  What this passage suggests is that if we want to transform or 
challenge the logic of capitalist accumulation then we ought to have a very good understanding 
not only of its historical emergence but also of the ongoing process of capitalization. It is within 
this spirit that we would like to conclude with the idea that we can retain an international and 
interconnected perspective on the origins of capitalism without sacrificing a convincing 
definition and explanation of ‘capital’ and really existing ‘capitalism’ found in the Capital as 
Power approach to IPE.  Whether Marxists will come around to the view that it is the act of 
capitalization rooted in ownership that ultimately matters for accumulation and that the 
magnitude of accumulation, at base, rests on the production and consumption of non-renewable 
fossil fuels and the control of human labor power remains to be seen.   
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